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ABSTRACT
When it comes to criminal investigation, time travel is increasingly possible. Despite longstanding
roots in traditional investigation, science is today providing something fundamentally different in
the form of remarkably complete digital records. And those big data records not only store our past,
but thanks to data mining they are in many circumstances eerily good at predicting our future.
So, now that we stand on the threshold of investigatory time travel, how should the Fourth
Amendment and legislation respond? How should we approach bulk government capture, such as
by a solar-powered drone employing wide-area persistent stare technology? Is it meaningfully
different from civilian equivalents that find their way into government hands, whether it be
tomorrow’s drone flight, or today’s record of all of our internet activity compiled by our internet
service provider, or a current record of all of our movements compiled by our mobile phone
company? What of targeted time machines such as government over-seizure of digital data in
every computer search? This Article considers the benefits and costs of these miraculous timemachine technologies, including as evidenced by several recent court opinions. Considering the
very serious privacy implications—from the individual to the relational and societal—we have
good reason to be wary of their coming ubiquity. Yet perhaps in very limited spheres we should
welcome them, going so far as to entirely abandon front-end acquisition restrictions and rely solely
upon ex post access, use, and disclosure limitations to protect the security in our persons, houses,
papers, and effects. I suggest that one such sphere might be law enforcement body cameras, an
instance in which full capture has great benefits, and via which we can experiment upon the
utility of solely ex post restraints.
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INTRODUCTION
Time travel fascinates, whether it is the 1895 science fiction of
1
2
H.G. Wells, the 1985 humor of Back to the Future, or the 2015 Holly3
4
wood manifestations in Terminator Genisys, Project Almanac, and
5
Tomorrowland. The reality is quite a bit more pedantic. Astronauts
travel into the future via the relativistic effects of time dilation, it is
6
true, but in an amount measured in milliseconds. To do anything
more impressive would require greater speeds than are currently pos7
8
sible. Gazing at the stars is seeing events of time past, it is true, but I
can do the same by inserting a DVD or opening a book. Travel into
the past remains the domain and dispute of theoretical physics and
its Einstein-Rosen Bridges, more commonly known as wormholes,

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8

H.G. WELLS, THE TIME MACHINE (1895).
BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal City Studios, Inc. 1985).
TERMINATOR GENISYS (Paramount Pictures 2015).
PROJECT ALMANAC (Paramount Pictures 2015).
TOMORROWLAND (Walt Disney Pictures 2015). Time travel has been a feature of hundreds of films. See Kenneth Krabat, All Time Travel Movies from 1896 and on, KENNETH
KRABATS 1000 STEMMER (Oct. 30, 2015), http://krabat.menneske.dk/kkblog/all-timetravel-movies/.
See Time Dilation, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_dilation (last visited
Feb. 13, 2016).
Id.
How far is a light year?, EARTHSKY (Nov. 27, 2015), http://earthsky.org/astronomyessentials/how-far-is-a-light-year.
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meaning that, so far as we know, traveling backwards in time might
9
10
prove forever impossible. So much for science.
Yet when it comes to criminal investigation, time travel seems increasingly possible. It is not actually time travel, of course, and it has
longstanding roots in traditional investigation. But science has provided us remarkably complete historical records in the form of digital
11
data. Well over a half century ago, Justice Robert H. Jackson recognized that “it would, no doubt, simplify enforcement of all criminal
laws if each citizen were required to keep a diary that would show
where he was at all times, with whom he was, and what he was up
12
to.” The law requires no such diary. Only in certain sector-specific
instances, such as banking, prescription records, or hotel registries,
13
has the law itself created comprehensive records. Nonetheless, we
increasingly create a diary like that Justice Jackson envisioned via our
smartphones and online technologies, and we even helpfully carry it
with us wherever we go. Further, the National Security Agency
(“NSA”) has demonstrated that data from various third party sources
might be gathered, stored, and later queried for evidence of criminal14
ity (or, in that case, evidence of threats to national security). In
15
short, we are “living in the golden age of surveillance.”
And lest we think criminal investigation can only offer that elusive
travel back in time, developments in data mining and machine learn9
10
11

12

13

14
15

See Wormhole, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wormhole (last visited Oct. 31,
2015).
If my statements are proved dramatically wrong and we do learn to travel into the past, I
will look to rewrite this.
See Stephen E. Henderson, Our Records Panopticon and the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 700–06 (2014) (chronicling the massive increase in digital information).
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 71 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing against
creation of the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination).
See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2456 (2015) (striking down an ordinance
giving police unrestricted and unchallengeable access to mandatory hotel guest registries); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600, 603–04 (1977) (permitting state prescription registry against constitutional challenge); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
(permitting government access to bank records required by Bank Secrecy Act of 1970).
The most robust category of ongoing, population-wide acquisition and databasing would
seem to be health information, but such acquisition has been little analyzed, perhaps because it is typically acquired for civil purposes. But that of course does not take it outside
of the ambit of the Fourth Amendment, and Wendy Mariner has written a critical analysis
of this historic “pass.” See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection
for Health Information Privacy, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 935 (2016).
See infra at 940–43.
BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND
CONTROL YOUR WORLD 4 (2015).
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ing are demonstrating that significant human behavior is predictable.
For example, one study using mobile phone data found that location
16
is 93% predictable, and based only upon Facebook “likes,” a computer was able to better predict personality and personal problems,
17
including substance abuse, than real-life friends. So, the more we
18
learn about the past, the better we can predict the future. We have
not reached anything like the world of Philip K. Dick’s The Minority
19
Report with its mutant forward-seeing precogs, or the world of Lewis
20
Padgett’s Private Eye with its ever-recording surroundings. But, as is
so often the case, today’s science is creeping towards yesterday’s science fiction.
So what happens as technology increasingly permits capture of
almost all information? How should we, and our constitutional jurisprudence, approach bulk government capture, such as by a solar21
powered drone employing wide-area persistent-stare technology, or
22
by a massive system of interconnected ground cameras? Is it equiva16

17

18

19
20
21

22

Chaoming Song et al., Limits of Predictability in Human Mobility, 327 SCIENCE 1018, 1021
(2010), http://www.barabasilab.com/pubs/CCNR-ALB_Publications/201002-19_SciencePredictability/201002-19_Science-Predictability.pdf; see also Dr Seldon, I Presume,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 2013, at 76.
See Clifton B. Parker, New Stanford Research Finds Computers Are Better Judges of Personality
Than Friends and Family, STANFORD REP. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://news.stanford.edu/
news/2015/january/personality-computer-knows-011215.html; Wu Youyou et al., Computer-based Personality Judgments Are More Accurate Than Those Made by Humans, 112 NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 1036, 1036–39 (2015), http://www.pnas.org/content/112/4/1036.full.pdf.
Police are increasingly interested in such prediction. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big
Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 369–73 (2015) (explaining
predictive policing); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion,
62 EMORY L.J. 259, 265–85 (2012) (same).
See The Minority Report, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Minority_Report
(describing the film) (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).
Lewis Padgett, Private Eye, in MIRROR OF INFINITY: A CRITIC’S ANTHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
FICTION 99 (Robert Silverberg ed. 1970).
See Ryan Gallagher, Could the Pentagon’s 1.8 Gigapixel Drone Camera Be Used for Domestic Surveillance?, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_
tense/2013/02/06/argus_is_could_the_pentagon_s_1_8_gigapixel_drone_camera_be_used_for_domestic.html
(describing government drone capability for data collection); Tyler Rogoway, Drones in
Afghanistan Have the Most Advanced Aerial Surveillance Ever, FOXTROT ALPHA (Apr. 6, 2015,
9:40
AM),
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/drones-in-afghanistan-have-the-mostadvanced-aerial-sur-1695912540 (describing the aptly named Gorgon Stare Increment II,
which combines images from 368 integrated cameras); Tyler Rogoway, How One New
Drone Tech Finally Allows All-Seeing Surveillance, FOXTROT ALPHA (Aug. 18, 2014, 12:45 PM),
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/how-one-new-drone-tech-finally-allows-all-seeing-survei1553272901 (explaining several such technologies and both their utilities and their dangers).
See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 35, 48–50 (2014) (describing New York’s "Domain Awareness System”); Somini
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lent to a general warrant that can never be reasonable, or is that too
23
simplistic an analogy? The general warrant permitted indiscriminate searching, not merely storing. Is such direct gathering meaningfully different from what the government could obtain from a private
24
party gathering such data, either by drone or by a vast network of
25
interconnected cameras? Is it meaningfully different from what is
available via an internet service provider that logs all of our online activity? Or from a mobile phone company tracking all of our movements? What about searches of our own devices that spy upon us,
like our computers that log information we do not realize or desire?
Can the government forever freeze and store that data, creating a
mini, targeted time machine? Can it do the same by recording every
home that officers enter, perhaps via officer body cameras?
While it may not be immediately obvious what to do about these
disparate Fourth Amendment time machines, there is value in considering them for what they are. We should consider how they affect
26
the security in our persons, houses, papers, and effects. And we
should consider their benefits to criminal investigation and, perhaps,
separately to front-end deterrence. We have always known that limited government norms like that expressed in the Fourth Amendment are anti-accuracy: if police could enter any home at will, or
27
even were quartered there, we would have less crime. But life would
be insufferable, and so we accept more crime in return for more lib-

23

24
25
26
27

Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-grows-incities.html (describing systems in several cities).
The general warrant in the form of the writs of assistance was a major impetus for the
American Revolution and for the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–27 (1886). For an analysis of the Fourth Amendment law of
government drone flight, see Marc Jonathan Blitz, James Grimsley, Stephen E. Henderson & Joseph Thai, Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 49, 65–72 (2015). See also David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 71–72 (2013) (citations omitted) (“In our view, the threshold Fourth Amendment question should be whether a technology has the capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable expectations
of quantitative privacy by raising the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use
of that technology is left to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement officers or other
government agents.”).
See generally Blitz et al., supra note 23, at 70–71 (explaining the First Amendment right to
fly recording drones and its connection to the Fourth Amendment).
See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, A Light Bulb Goes On, Over the Mall, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2015, at
B1 (describing systems of internet connected cameras placed in lighting).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 139 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment clearly embodies a judgment that some evidence of criminal activity may be
lost for the sake of protecting property and privacy rights.”).
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erty, while always attempting not only the ideal balance—whatever
that might be—but also always seeking pareto superior moves that increase one without lessening the other. As science increasingly permits capture without immediate human observation, does this call for
a fundamental rethinking? Should we in certain instances abandon
entirely front-end limitations on capture so long as we are guaranteed
evenhanded treatment that traditional investigation lacks, and backend limitations on access, use, and distribution? Can we ever feel secure if there is a government “database of ruin” that could be ac28
cessed at any moment? Yet can we turn our backs on the ability to
save lives and livelihoods, and in a manner that uniformly distributes
29
the privacy costs?
For some, perhaps the failed East German state and its Stasi is suf30
ficient answer, a view to which I am personally sympathetic. But, of
course, access to those secret police files was not strictly circumscribed by fair legal process, and, more importantly, the data in the
files were created by and for officers of the state. Should the same
rules apply when data are created for other, beneficial purposes, or
will never be subject to human analysis except upon demonstrated
31
cause? And if it becomes the case that, either on account of lack of
political will, or perhaps on account of very broadly interpreted First
32
Amendment rights, private third parties retain all data, is there a realistic way to keep them out of government hands, or do the more
important questions essentially once again amount to access, use, and
28

29

30

31

32

See Paul Ohm, Don’t Build a Database of Ruin, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug., 23, 2012),
https://hbr.org/2012/08/dont-build-a-database-of-ruin (arguing against thoughtless
databasing in the private sphere).
The details of any such claim to decreasing crime would be difficult, and would typically
rely less on preventing crime than on deterrence via raising the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, thereby raising crime’s expected cost. Whereas ex ante detection via
data mining is extremely difficult and in some contexts currently impossible, ex post sifting through data to find then-evident connections is much easier. See SCHNEIER, supra
note 15, at 136–40. And it is not hard to see that knowing everything tends to discourage
crime and facilitate its apprehension.
See, e.g., GARY BRUCE, THE FIRM: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STASI (2010); ANNA FUNDER,
STASILAND: STORIES FROM BEHIND THE BERLIN WALL (2011); ROBERT H. SLOAN &
RICHARD WARNER, THE SELF, THE STASI, THE NSA: PRIVACY, KNOWLEDGE, AND COMPLICITY
IN
THE
SURVEILLANCE STATE (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 5),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2577308. For a beautiful film fictionalizing some of the personal costs—and triumphs—of the human spirit in such surveillance conditions, see THE
LIVES OF OTHERS (Sony Pictures 2006).
See, e.g., Persistent Stare Through Imagination, U. ARIZ. SCH. INFO.: SCI., TECH., AND ARTS,
http://w3.sista.arizona.edu/minds-eye.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2015) (seeking to build
an artificially intelligent surveillance system).
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43, 367–71 (2010) (recognizing robust First Amendment rights of corporations).
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disclosure? If a store-everything world is so abhorrent—and I personally believe it might be—then why do we keep rushing towards
33
precisely that?
Big questions rarely have small or singular answers, and this Article will hardly provide either. But it can begin the conversation or,
more accurately, continue it under different framing. It does so in
the following manner. Part I reminds us what the National Security
Agency was attempting with its bulk telephone metadata collection,
and then looks at two recent court decisions, one by a Second Circuit
34
panel in United States v. Ganias (now headed en banc) and one from
35
the United States Supreme Court in Riley v. California, each of which
articulates a realization that historic digital data are meaningfully different for Fourth Amendment purposes. It then considers the Supreme Court’s most recent Fourth Amendment decision, City of Los
Angeles v. Patel, in which the Court floats the proposition that recordkeeping for purposes of deterrence might be a “special need” subject
36
to more lenient Fourth Amendment rules. All three decisions and
the NSA metadata program concern what might be considered
Fourth Amendment time machines.
Part II canvasses the important principles of information privacy
that are at stake. Part III then travels back in time to consider a 1995
proposal by Harold Krent in which he argues the Fourth Amendment
should employ use restrictions upon data law enforcement has lawful37
ly acquired. The Second Circuit panel in Ganias would have recog-

33

34
35
36
37

Information security expert and frequent commentator Bruce Schneier declared “game
over” in 2013:
So, we’re done. Welcome to a world where Google knows exactly what sort of
porn you all like, and more about your interests than your spouse does. Welcome
to a world where your cell phone company knows exactly where you are all the
time. Welcome to the end of private conversations, because increasingly your
conversations are conducted by e-mail, text, or social networking sites.
And welcome to a world where all of this, and everything else that you do or is
done on a computer, is saved, correlated, studied, passed around from company to
company without your knowledge or consent . . . . Welcome to an Internet without
privacy, and we’ve ended up here with hardly a fight.
Bruce Schneier, The Internet Is a Surveillance State, CNN, (Mar. 16, 2013, 2:04 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/16/opinion/schneier-internet-surveillance/index.html.
Perhaps, however, at least some of the problem is one of market failure that could be
remedied via regulation requiring internalizing of privacy harms. See A. Michael
Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1713, 1728–37 (2015).
755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015) (en banc).
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015).
Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74
TEX. L. REV. 49 (1995).

940

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:3

nized such a restriction. 38 It would of course be a significant further
move to argue that the Fourth Amendment might be satisfied by such
restrictions alone, a move I believe is fraught with great danger in
most contexts. But perhaps there are limited contexts in which a
move to solely use restrictions is one that legislatures, courts, agencies, and commentators should at least debate, if not begin to experiment with. Particularly when designed by legislatures, perhaps programs of uniform applicability should generally be considered
constitutionally reasonable. And if there is any chance we are ever to
rely solely upon back-end limitations in the world of Fourth Amendment time machines, it would be best to start learning now, in smaller
spheres, whether such means can ever alone guarantee the securities
promised by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, perhaps an ideal sphere
for experimentation might be officer body cameras. Here the benefits of always recording are sufficiently great, and the domain sufficiently narrow, that it seems reasonable—and perhaps wise—to always record and to rely upon access, use, and disclosure limitations to
protect our security interests.
I. THE NSA, HARD DRIVES, CELL PHONES, AND HOTEL REGISTRIES
On June 6, 2013, Glenn Greenwald broke the first story based up39
on the disclosures of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Pursuant to an order from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, Verizon Business was providing the National Security Agency,
“on an ongoing daily basis,” “all call detail records or ‘telephony
metadata’ created . . . for communications (i) between the United
States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including
40
“Telephony metadata” was defined to inlocal telephone calls.”
clude “originating and terminating telephone number” and “time
41
and duration of the call.” The NSA was creating a database of all
telephone calls made on the Verizon Business network. Similar or-

38
39

40

41

See infra at 945–46.
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsaphone-records-verizon-court-order. Many others would follow. See GLENN GREENWALD,
NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 90–
169 (2014) (discussing the programs Snowden disclosed).
Secondary Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 13-80, at 1–2 (FISC Apr. 25, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-datacourt-order.
Id. at 2.
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ders were issued to other carriers, such that the NSA was databasing
42
virtually all telephone calls made or received in the United States.
Why? Perhaps no program of surveillance is surprising for an
agency that eerily declares its “collection posture” as “Sniff it All—
Know it All—Collect it All—Process it All—Exploit it All—Partner
43
[Share] it All.” But why in particular did the NSA want to gather
44
these phone records? Because the NSA wanted a time machine. Say
on August 1, 2015, the agency obtained reason to believe a particular
telephone number, 301-688-6524, was being used by a terrorist. That
might lead to a court order requiring the provider to place a pen reg45
ister and trap and trace device on that line, but of course the line
might at this point be abandoned, or at least this would not reveal
communications made in the past. So, a court order might require
46
the provider to produce historic records. Only the provider might
have retained those records for only a limited duration. Moreover,
the NSA wanted guaranteed access not only to the numbers with
which 301-688-6524 had communicated (first “hop”), but also the
numbers with which those first hop numbers had communicated (second “hop”), and further the numbers with which those second hop
47
persons had communicated (third “hop”). The amount of data is
growing exponentially, such that if each telephone number communicated with one hundred others, the NSA is looking at one million
records. Quite convenient, then, to have everything stored and ready
48
to query in their own servers. Time machines are handy like that.
The NSA claimed statutory authorization to create this “historical
49
50
repository” was found in Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.

42

See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 796–97 (2d Cir. 2015); PRIVACY
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM
CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 8 (2014), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/
pclob-215.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB REPORT].
Greenwald, supra note 39, at 97.
This particular time machine would also be useful as, over time, the world’s largest social
network map.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012) (authorizing approved use of pen register or trap and trade
device for investigation).
See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (authorizing such orders).
See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 797; PCLOB REPORT, supra note 42, at 9, 28–29.
The bulk telephony metadata program was not the NSA’s only time machine. See, e.g.,
Bruce Schneier, More about the NSA’s XKEYSCORE, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (July 7, 2015,
6:38 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/more_about_the_.html
(explaining another program by which the NSA pulled massive amounts of internet data
from fiber optic backbone cables).
Clapper, 785 F.3d at 812.
AND

43
44
45
46
47
48

49
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Whether or not it would be ideal to create such time machines, the
51
NSA was certainly wrong in claiming it had been granted here.
Thus, the co-author of USA PATRIOT worked to enact legislation
that has, for now, shut down this particular program, at least in the
sense that the telephone records are no longer being centralized
52
from all providers and held by the government. But this has not
53
been the first such government attempt, and it would be startling if
it is the last. There is nothing particularly special about telephone
numbers that make them the only useful time machine metadata:
54
the same use could be made of financial, internet, and other data.
In rejecting the NSA’s contention that its bulk collection satisfied the
required relevance threshold, the Second Circuit reasoned as follows:
If information can be deemed relevant solely because of its necessity to a
particular process that the government has chosen to employ, regardless
of its subject matter, then so long as “the government develops an effective means of searching through everything in order to find something, . . . everything becomes relevant to its investigations”—and the gov-

50

51

52

53

54

Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT ACT”) Act of 2001 § 215, Pub. L. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT
Act].
See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 812–21 (holding that Section 215 did not authorize the telephony
data collection program); PCLOB REPORT, supra note 42, at 10 (“conclud[ing] that Section 215 does not provide an adequate legal basis to support the [telephone records]
program”); Stephen E. Henderson, A Rose By Any Other Name: Regulating Law Enforcement
Bulk Metadata Collection, 94 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 28 (2016) (same).
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 (“USA FREEDOM Act of 2015”) §§ 101–10, Pub. L.
114-23, 129 Stat. 268-76 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861); Lisa Mascaro, House Overwhelmingly Approves Bill to Curb NSA Domestic Spying, L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-nsa-reforms-20140523-story.html. According to Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, the NSA interpretation was “like scooping up
the entire ocean to guarantee you catch a fish.” Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Siobhan
Gorman, Secret Court Ruling Expanded Spy Powers, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2013, at A4.
For years, the DEA collected massive amounts of telephone metadata for international
calls under its administrative subpoena authority, an apparent precursor to the NSA bulk
collection. See Brad Heath, U.S. Secretly Tracked Billions of Calls for Decades, USA TODAY
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/dea-bulk-telephonesurveillance-operation/70808616/. And there was of course the ill-fated Total Information Awareness program. See Joshua Partlow, Senate Votes to Deny Funding To Computer
Surveillance Effort, WASH. POST, July 19, 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
business/2003/07/19/senate-votes-to-deny-funding-to-computer-surveillanceeffort/251243f1-8a66-4693-9970-f714130b783f/ (discussing the Senate’s denial of funding
to the Total Information Awareness initiative, a computer surveillance program that
would enable the government to amass and search databases of records for potential terrorist activity).
Clapper, 785 F.3d at 818.
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ernment’s “technological capacity to ingest information and sift through
55
it efficiently” would be the only limit to what is relevant.

This criticism, first made by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board, is a fair criticism of the NSA’s interpretation of “relevance,” in
that it is an interpretation inconsistent with legal tradition. But notice the proposition is not illogical: if later searches would prove useful in investigating national security threats (or crime), the existence
of the database is relevant to a legitimate government role, and the
56
program did include audit, security, and reporting requirements.
But again, in this case it was clear this novel interpretation was not
one Congress intended. The Second Circuit was correct that:
Such expansive development of government repositories of formerly private records would be an unprecedented contraction of the privacy expectations of all Americans. Perhaps such a contraction is required by
national security needs in the face of the dangers of contemporary domestic and international terrorism. But we would expect such a momentous decision to be preceded by substantial debate, and expressed in
57
unmistakable language.

Instead, USA PATRIOT and its legislative sponsors intended, and
58
But
therefore used, the traditional language of legal relevance.
what if the debate occurred and that unmistakable language did
come about? Then there would of course be the question of whether
it is a method of investigation the Constitution will abide. Although
the Second Circuit did not decide this constitutional issue, it recognized the issue as “one of the most difficult issues in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the extent to which modern technology alters
59
our traditional expectations of privacy.”
Is this an issue of technology? After all, was not the first investigating “time machine” an officer taking notes on what she hears and
sees, not to mention the myriad recordkeeping requirements imposed by the modern industrial State? Three recent decisions shed
more light on this issue: a panel decision in the Second Circuit (now
headed en banc) considering a digital time machine in the form of

55
56

57
58
59

Id. at 818 n.10 (quoting PCLOB REPORT, supra note 42, at 62).
Id. at 797–98 (terming them “minimization procedures”); PCLOB REPORT, supra note 42,
at 33–36. Those requirements did not, however, protect data that had been found responsive to seed queries and thus was placed in the NSA “corporate store.” PCLOB
REPORT, supra note 42, at 30–31. In other words, access to once responsive data was
thereafter unrestricted.
Clapper, 785 F.3d at 818.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 822.
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government preservation of private computer hard drives, 60 a decision by the United States Supreme Court considering a voluntarily
compiled and carried digital time machine in the form of a mobile
61
phone, and another decision by the Supreme Court considering
much more old-fashioned recordkeeping in the form of a hotel guest
62
registry.
A. Ganias and Preservation of Hard Drives
In November of 2003, federal agents executed a search warrant on
63
the accounting offices of Stavros Ganias. Ganias himself was not the
target, but rather the Army was investigating one of his clients with
64
The agents executing the warrant
whom the Army contracted.
therefore did not remove Ganias’s three computers, respecting his as
an ongoing business, but instead mirrored the hard drives, making
65
exact duplications thereof. Forensics examiners thereafter copied
that data onto two sets of identical DVDs, thereby preserving the gov66
ernment originals from any harm occasioned by access.
That access would not occur for eight months, until July 2004,
when Army forensics agents began to review the DVDs pursuant to
67
When they discovered the suspect business
the search warrant.
might have committed tax fraud, they shared a copy of the data with
68
the IRS, and together the two sets of investigators ultimately identi69
fied all responsive material by December of 2004. Nonetheless, the
agents did nothing to try and delete or return the non-responsive material. Unlike for seized physical items, these agents never consider
70
“[Y]ou never
deleting or returning non-responsive digital data.
71
know what data you may need in the future,” testified one.
In July of 2005, some twenty months after the search of Ganias’s
office and corresponding seizure of his computer data, Army and IRS
investigators came to believe that Ganias might have been underre60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 791 F.3d 290 (2d
Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447 (2015).
Ganias, 755 F.3d at 128.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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porting income, and therefore expanded their investigation to in72
clude him as a suspect. They therefore wanted to have another look
at his files, but appropriately did not consider their mere possession
73
of those files to authorize further searches thereof.
To understand why, one must first consider traditional searches
and basic Fourth Amendment law. When police search a home pursuant to a warrant, they may look only where sought-after items can
74
be. And they may seize only things the warrant authorizes, or things
so located for which authority for seizure is “immediately apparent,”
75
such as child pornography or obviously illegal drugs. These things
76
are said to be in “plain view.” So, for example, police searching for
a large knife should not open a small book at all—it cannot contain
the sought-after knife, and therefore is not subject to search. Whereas police searching for a knife and any threatening communications
could peruse the small book. But upon finding it to contain entirely
unrelated material, police of course must leave the book behind unless that material is independently subject to seizure, meaning the officer has probable cause to believe it either the fruit of crime (it appears to be a rare book that was reported stolen), an instrumentality
of crime (it appears to be the very book used to lure a young victim),
contraband (it appears to contain child pornography), or evidence of
crime (it appears to contain the planning for a recent bank rob77
In rare instances, large quantities of physical documents
bery).
might be impossible to sort onsite, but then special rules are to be fol78
lowed.
With computers, everything is done differently. Because they contain so much disparate data, and in so many formats, police cannot
reasonably be expected to bring experts to sufficiently sort through it
79
on site. Thus, courts all permit over-seizure of digital evidence in eve72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id. at 129, 133 n.7.
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140–41 (1990).
Id. at 136–37.
Id.
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967).
Ganias, 755 F.3d at 135 (citing United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595–96 (9th Cir.
1982)).
See OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING
COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 76–79
(2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/
ssmanual2009.pdf. For an analysis of the law regulating the forensic search, see Stephen
E. Henderson, What Alex Kozinski and the Investigation of Earl Bradley Teach About Searching
and Seizing Computers and the Dangers of Inevitable Discovery, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 115, 130–36
(2013).
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ry instance: the entire hard drive, say, can be seized even though
much, most, or even all of its contents—entire libraries of digital materials, let alone files arguably equivalent to that small book found in
80
the hypothetical home search—are in fact entirely innocent.
Investigators have thus obtained a time machine. Following the
November 2003 execution of the search warrant, Ganias modified the
81
relevant files. Therefore, had the government not over-seized and
then retained digital content that it knew was not relevant to the first
investigation, and therefore which was not covered by the original
82
warrant, this evidence would not have existed. Yet because agents
did retain not only the exact copies of his hard drive but also the
DVDs, the data did exist. And they might retain such data for ten,
83
twenty, or a hundred years. So, pursuant to another warrant obtained in April 2006—some two-and-a-half years after the data’s seizure—the government once again searched the data and found incriminating evidence. Time machines are handy like that.
The Second Circuit panel addressed just this time machine functionality, although its opinion is now vacated pending en banc re84
view :
[W]e consider a [] limited question: whether the Fourth Amendment
permits officials executing a warrant for the seizure of particular data on
a computer to seize and indefinitely retain every file on that computer
85
for use in future criminal investigations. We hold that is does not.

The over two-year retention of Ganias’s unresponsive data, retained a
year and a half after the government had concluded it was non86
responsive, violated the Fourth Amendment. Or, at the very least,
87
its use in a future criminal investigation did.
80
81
82
83

84
85

86

See Ganias, 755 F.3d at 135–36 (collecting cases).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 130, 138 n.11.
For the various FBI retention policies, see Records Control Schedules, NATIONAL ARCHIVES
AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/
?dir=/departments/department-of-justice/rg-0065; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, A GUIDE TO CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN FBI RECORDS
(2010), https://www.fbi.gov/foia/a-guide-to-conducting-research-in-fbi-records.
The
harms are of course even greater when law enforcement has seized the originals and not
merely image copies. See, e.g., United States v. Gladding, 775 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.
2014) (requiring the government to prove it is not feasible to disaggregate, and then return, innocent over-seized data).
Ganias, 791 F.3d 290.
Ganias, 755 F.3d at 137. Cf. United States v. Johnston, 789 F.3d 934, 941–43 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding, without considering Ganias, that a five-year delay in searching a computer pursuant to the original warrant is not constitutionally problematic).
Ganias, 755 F.3d at 138. In so holding, the court importantly sided with those arguing
Fourth Amendment seizure is implicated by any meaningful deprivation in the exclusive
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I agree, though I differ from the panel’s reasoning. The panel believed the government’s position would mean that “every warrant to
search for particular electronic data would become, in essence, a
88
general warrant.” That does not seem quite apt, as a general warrant permitted the executive to search anyone’s house for information
89
of interest, or at least one person’s house for anything incriminat90
ing, whereas both in 2003 and in 2006 the government obtained a
warrant demonstrating particularized suspicion towards Ganias’s data, and in each instance agents thereafter only looked for the responsive data. Instead, the government’s position would turn every computer warrant into an investigative time machine.
It is a serious invasion if the government can over-seize massive
amounts of private information and forever retain it for indefinite
later search. One can understand the concern of the government,
which is that if the data are not retained in their original form it
might be difficult to answer later claims of unreasonable search or
91
challenges to authentication. But, like the panel, I do not see that

87

88
89

90
91

possession of property. Id. at 137 (“The Government’s retention of copies of Ganias’s
personal computer records for two-and-a-half years deprived him of exclusive control over
those files for an unreasonable amount of time. . . . This was a meaningful interference
with Ganias’s possessory rights in those files and constituted a seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.”). See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment Right to Delete, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 10, 12 (2005) (arguing for such an interpretation).
Ganias, 755 F.3d at 139 (“[E]ven if we assumed it were necessary to maintain a complete
copy of the hard drive solely to authenticate evidence responsive to the original warrant,
that does not provide a basis for using the mirror image for any other purpose.”). Id. at
138 (“[T]he Government clearly violated Ganias’s Fourth Amendment rights by retaining
the files for a prolonged period of time and then using them in a future criminal investigation.” (emphasis added)). Id. at 139 (“Because the Government has demonstrated no legal basis for retaining the non-responsive documents, its retention and subsequent search of
those documents were unconstitutional.” (emphasis added)); id. at 141 (“We conclude
that the Government violated Ganias’s Fourth Amendment rights by seizing and indefinitely retaining non-responsive computer records, and then searching them when it later developed probable cause.” (emphasis added)).
Id. at 139.
See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING
602–1791, at 233 (2009). Thus, a warrant for stolen sheep in 1749 instructed the local
constable to “diligently search every suspected House and Place within your Parish, which
you and the . . . [owner of the sheep] shall think convenient to search.” Id. (citations
omitted).
A 1661 warrant authorized the executive “to make diligent
search . . . throughout the whole town of Milford and the precincts thereof . . . ; and this
to be in all dwelling houses, barnes or other buildings whatsoever, and vessels in the harbor.” Id. at 234–36 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a
warrant permitting seizure of “evidence of crime” as an impermissible general warrant).
See Ganias, 755 F.3d at 139; Recent Cases, Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure and Evidence Retention—Second Circuit Creates a Potential “Right to Deletion” of Imaged Hard Drives.—
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as an impossible hurdle. 92 So, perhaps the panel’s answer is broadly
the right answer: maybe the Fourth Amendment bans even relatively
small digital time machines, no matter how useful, no matter how
regulated, and no matter how democratically conceived and applied.
The government can retain the data for its original purposes as long
as it must, but cannot search the data for any other. Or, perhaps
such time machines are only permissible where government need is
at its highest, such as for purposes of national security, or where the
retention was pursuant to a carefully structured—and fairly inclusive—legislative authorization. I will return to these questions below.
The immediate point is merely to highlight that digital evidence has
made these questions increasingly pressing.
The Supreme Court came to the same realization when it considered searches of cell phones incident to lawful arrest.
B. Riley and Searches of Cell Phones
David Riley was stopped for a minor traffic infraction, his car was
searched pursuant to impoundment, and he was arrested for illegally
93
possessing two handguns found therein. As police are permitted to
94
do as a routine incident of any lawful arrest, officers searched Riley’s
95
person and found a smartphone in his pocket. A search of that
phone onsite and a couple of hours later at the station yielded relevant evidence in the form of incriminating text messages, videos, and
96
images.
The Supreme Court consolidated Riley’s case with that of Brima
97
Wurie, who was arrested following an apparent drug sale. At the police station, officers seized two phones from his person, and one of
them—a flip phone—continued to receive calls from a number the
98
phone identified as “my house.” Officers opened the phone and
accessed the call log, thereby obtaining the phone number associated
99
with these calls.
The Court resoundingly rejected both searches:

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014)., 128 HARV. L. REV. 743, 748–50
(2014).
Ganias, 755 F.3d at 139.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–36 (1973).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
Id. at 2480–81.
Id. at 2481.
Id.
Id.
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Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience.
With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.” [quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886)] The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry
such information in his hand does not make the information any less
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to
the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized
100
incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.

Established doctrine would allow similar searches of non-digital
containers immediately associated with an arrestee’s person, includ101
ing any found in the same pocket as Riley’s phone. So, why did all
nine Justices reject these mobile phone searches? Lacking both
102
precedent and any “precise guidance from the founding era,” the
Court had to make its own assessment of what constitutes an “unrea103
sonable” search, and that is done “by assessing, on the one hand,
the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legit104
imate governmental interests.”
The governmental interests motivating searches incident to ar105
rest—officer safety and evidence preservation —are not particularly
relevant to this Article. But, very briefly, what swayed the Court was
106
that the interests are generally less significant in the digital context.
As for officer safety, there is no possibility the digital data will harm
the arresting officers, unlike, say, a surreptitious knife or razor
107
blade. As for the remote possibility the data would inform officers
of indirect harm—for example, that dangerous confederates were en
route—the Court properly held this to be a case-specific exigent cir100

101

102

103

104
105
106
107

Id. at 2494–95; see also id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring in part and in the judgment but
expressing reservations with the majority’s limiting theory of search incident to arrest and
expressing a willingness to reconsider if legislatures lead the way); United States v.
Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 941–43 (9th Cir. 2014) (extending Riley’s protection of mobile
phones to exempt them from the automobile exception to the warrant requirement).
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (discussing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977),
which distinguished between searches of items “immediately associated with the person of
the arrestee” and those otherwise within the arrestee’s reach (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S.
at 15)).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (recognizing that not only was there no equivalent at the time of
the founding, but that even the less sophisticated flip-phones “are based on technology
nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago”).
Id. at 2482 (“As the [Fourth Amendment] text makes clear, the ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
403 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
Id. at 2483 (explaining the genesis of these twin aims).
See id. at 2485–88 (applying the criteria to mobile phones).
Id. at 2485.
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cumstance sufficiently accounted for by that doctrine. 108 In other
words, it will be the exception, not the rule. Similarly, there is little
risk of evidence destruction once the officers seize the mobile phone,
as even the typically negligible possibility of the device being remotely
wiped can be countered with a Faraday bag, the cheap version of
109
which is wrapping the phone in aluminum foil.
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, the privacy interest in digital data is very significant, both in terms of quality and
110
While the government urged “that a search of all data
quantity.
stored on a cell phone is ‘materially indistinguishable’ from” searches
of wallets and purses, to the Court, “[t]hat is like saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
111
moon.”
As for quality, “[A] cell phone collects in one place many distinct
types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank
statement, a video—that reveal much more in combination than any
112
As for quantity, a “phone’s capacity allows even
isolated record.”
just one type of information to convey far more than previously pos113
114
sible.” Such is the marvel of digital data and its modern storage.
Indeed, “it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90%
of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to
115
It did not come at government behest, as Justice
the intimate.”
116
Jackson feared in 1948, but it came nonetheless. Each such person
is carrying a time machine, and the Court has now recognized how
especially private are the digital data contained therein. As the Court
108
109

110
111
112

113
114
115
116

Id. at 2485–86.
Id. at 2486–88. The government also raised, for the first time before the Supreme Court,
that the officers might be able to immediately access the data before the phone “locks,” at
which point encryption might render the data unreachable even pursuant to a valid warrant. Id. at 2486–87. The Court had two responses. First, officers who encounter an unlocked phone and who have probable cause can perhaps take the minimal steps necessary
to turn off the auto-locking feature. Id. at 2487–88. Moreover, this situation—like the
possibility of dangerous confederates texting of their approach—is sufficiently unlikely
that it is otherwise properly handled via exigent circumstances. Id. at 2487.
Id. at 2489.
Id. at 2488.
Id. at 2489 (explaining that mobile phones “could just as easily be called cameras, video
players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps,
or newspapers”).
Id.
See Henderson, supra note 11, at 700–03 (chronicling the massive increase in digital storage).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
See supra note 12.
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recognized, a single mobile phone will often contain more infor117
Time machines are useful like that.
mation than an entire home.
In the words of the Court, “In the cell phone context, . . . it is reasonable to expect that incriminating information will be found on a
118
phone regardless of when the crime occurred.”
So, while Riley perhaps left things unanswered that it could have
119
addressed, it made very clear that when it comes to the Fourth
Amendment, digital is different. And while compelled government
access therefore required a warrant, this does not necessarily mean
the Court is generally averse to the existence of digital time machines. The Court’s most recent Fourth Amendment decision, which
considered records that could be either analog or digital, contains a
facially surprising claim that is a nod to time machines’ utility.
C. Patel and Searches of Hotel Registries
City of Los Angeles v. Patel is a case about mini, government120
A
mandated time machines in the form of hotel guest registries.
provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code requires that hotels
record and maintain information about their guests, including name
and address, vehicle license plate of any car parked on the premises,
121
Under certain circumstances additional
and method of payment.
identification information must be recorded, such as when a guest
pays by cash, rents a room without a reservation, or stays for fewer

117

118
119

120
121

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. The Court had previously rejected the claim that officers could
search an entire home incident to arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753, 755,
768 (1969); see also 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc. v. New York County
Dist. Attorney’s Off., 2015 WL 4429025, at *7 (N.Y.S.3d July 21, 2015) (“Our holding today [that there is neither a constitutional nor statutory right to challenge of a search warrant other than a defendant’s motion to suppress] does not mean that we do not appreciate Facebook’s concerns about the scope of the bulk warrants issued here or about the
District Attorney’s alleged right to indefinitely retain the seized accounts of the uncharged Facebook users. Facebook users share more intimate personal information
through their Facebook accounts than may be revealed through rummaging about one’s
home. These bulk warrants demanded ‘all’ communications in 24 broad categories from
the 381 targeted accounts. Yet, of the 381 targeted Facebook user accounts only 62 were
actually charged with any crime.”).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492.
See generally Ric Simmons, The Missed Opportunities of Riley v. California, 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 253 (2014) (arguing that the Riley Court did not “repair the critically flawed
search incident to arrest doctrine” or “provide useful guidance for law enforcement officers faced with emerging technologies”).
135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447–48 (2015).
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49(2)(a) (2008), http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2006/
06-0125-s1_ord_179533.pdf.
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than twelve hours. 122 Registry information must be maintained for a
period of ninety days, and must be made available upon officer re123
As the recent publicity regarding the hack of cheating or
quest.
124
“adultery” website Ashley Madison demonstrates, it is not hard to
imagine some of the privacy interests implicated by knowledge of ho125
tel stays.
At the same time, such a recordkeeping requirement is hardly
126
novel, and the hotels did not challenge it. A group of hotel operators did, however, challenge the provision requiring that the registry
“shall be made available to any officer of the Los Angeles Police De127
They contended such unrestrained acpartment for inspection.”
cess violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and a closely divided
128
According to the five Justice majority, the
Supreme Court agreed.
officer demand requirement is unconstitutional because it offers no
129
opportunity for pre-compliance legal challenge, essentially combining the ease of an administrative subpoena with the effectiveness of a
warrant. Patel is an important opinion, because it permits meaningful
130
facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment, and because it lim122
123
124

125

126

127
128
129
130

Id. § 41.49(4).
Id. § 41.49(3)(a).
See, e.g., Dino Grandoni, Ashley Madison, a Dating Website, Says Hackers May Have Data on
Millions, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/technology/
hacker-attack-reported-on-ashley-madison-a-dating-service.html; Emma Johnson, Ashley
Madison Hack Would Mean ‘Boon for Divorce Lawyers and Marriage Therapists,’ FORBES (July
20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/emmajohnson/2015/07/20/ashley-madisonhack-would-mean-boon-for-divorce-lawyers-and-marriage-therapists/.
See, e.g., Tina Kelly, Mayflower Mystery: Room 871, Where Are You?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20,
2008),
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/mayflower-mystery-room-871where-are-you/ (detailing how Governor Eliot Spitzer enjoyed the services of a prostitute
in The Mayflower’s room 871); Sarah Kershaw & Michael Powell, Just a Hotel? For Some,
It’s an Adventure, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2008, at G1 (generally describing prostitution at
the Mayflower Hotel).
Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2454 (“Respondents have not challenged and nothing in our opinion
calls into question those parts of § 41.49 that require hotel operators to maintain guest
registries containing certain information.”).
L.A., CAL. MUN. CODE, supra note 121, at § 41.49(3)(a).
Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2451.
Id.
Id. at 2449 (“We first clarify that facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not
categorically barred or especially disfavored.”). Even with facial challenges theoretically
available, they could never be successful if defeated by the possibility that an officer possessing a valid warrant could make the records request, that an officer in an emergency could
make the records request, or that the subject of a request could consent. Fortunately, the
Court recognized an unrestricted access statute can be facially unconstitutional regardless
of those possibilities, because they are properly understood as independent from the
grounds of a statutory access not requiring any of them. Id. at 2450–51. Cf. id. at 2464–66
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing otherwise).
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its what has been a nebulous “closely regulated industry exception.”131
But what is of interest for this Article is the Court’s dictum regarding
deterrence.
The Court assumed, without deciding, that the government purpose for the registry program was a “special need” outside of ordinary
132
crime control, thus lessening the Fourth Amendment burden.
Since the ordinance was clearly aimed at solving crime, it is hard to
imagine what this special need would be. Although the boundaries
have always been unclear, in the automobile context, for example,
the Court has differentiated roadblocks aimed at preventing highway
fatalities and carnage (a special need), from those aimed at interdict133
ing drugs (ordinary crime control). Officers accessing the historic
registry were unlikely to prevent imminent threatened harm akin to
that posed by drunk drivers, as opposed to finding the clues necessary
to prosecute past offenses. This seems true by definition for a registry
dating back three months.
Yet the Court assumed a special need, namely deterring criminali134
It seems hard to imagine deterrence of criminality can be a
ty.
meaningful special need: deterrence is not the reason for legitimate
police investigation that constitutes a search or a seizure, but instead
is the happy—albeit very important—byproduct of investigating actual crime. In other words, surely police cannot routinely make warrantless entry into homes and claim the “special need” of deterring
crimes that might otherwise be committed therein. Instead, when
law enforcement officers enter homes pursuant to lawful warrants or
exceptions thereto, and people learn of those events including sub-

131

132
133

134

Id. at 2454–56. The Court has declared four closely regulated industries, for which it
permits systems of routine, suspicionless inspection: liquor distribution, firearms distribution, mining, and automobile junkyards. Id. at 2454. Before Patel, it was unclear
whether a legislature could effectively get around the Fourth Amendment: subject a business to sufficient regulation, such that it is pervasively regulated, and now the Fourth
Amendment has little play. The Court majority signaled this would not be possible, finding the exception to apply only when something “inherent in the operation of [the business] poses a clear and significant risk to the public welfare.” Id. This remains somewhat
nebulous, especially given the disparate existing four categories, but at least it is a more
limited sort of nebulous.
Id. at 2452.
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (striking down drug interdiction checkpoints); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (allowing sobriety checkpoints).
Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2452 (“Here, we assume that the searches authorized by § 41.49 serve a
‘special need’ other than conducting criminal investigations: They ensure compliance
with the recordkeeping requirement, which in turn deters criminals from operating on
the hotels’ premises.”).
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sequent prosecutions, they are deterred from themselves engaging in
such criminality.
So, why the odd assertion of deterrence as a special need? Presumably because of the intuition that the registry requirement, like
other and more significant time machines, is an effective—and perhaps smart—way to go after criminal behavior. But even if that might
be so, the Court was right to find problematic the complete absence
of access restrictions given the privacy interests at stake. Indeed, it is
worth stepping back to broadly consider these interests of information privacy before contemplating what they implicate for investigatory time machines.
II. PRIVACY
As integral as privacy is to most of our lives—or at least as integral
as I believe it is to mine—there is considerable controversy and confusion as to its definition, including as to whether it is a state of being
135
In other words, is “perfect” privacy achieved only when
or a right.
nobody has any information about and access to my person (which
sounds rather awful), or also when I have complete control over
those modes of access but have volitionally granted them in certain
136
Learned philosophical
amounts (which sounds rather utopian)?
minds have debated these concepts for years and presumably will for
as long as there are philosophers to debate. My less philosophically
tutored mind finds useful—and for criminal procedure purposes
seemingly sufficient—the construct that information privacy is the ability of a person to control what information about her is given to oth137
Such a control construct was most noers, and for what purposes.

135

136
137

See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 425–28 (1980) (arguing privacy is a “condition of life,” not a claim or form of control). See generally
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY (Ferdinand David Schoeman
ed., 1984); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); Daniel J.
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002).
See Gavison, supra note 135, at 428.
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS 49–52, 57–58 (3d ed. 2013); Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 227, 229–34 (2012). Information privacy can be contrasted
with decision privacy, the latter encompassing decisions about bodily autonomy like what
medical treatment to receive. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989) (“As we have pointed out before, ‘[t]he cases sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different
kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.’” (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977))).
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tably articulated by Alan Westin 138 and Charles Fried, 139 and has been
140
recognized by the Supreme Court.
So understood, privacy can be seen as a constitutive element of
human autonomy, or as a key element in the identity formation and
141
In the
mental freedom that is central to a fully realized autonomy.
words of Thomas Nagel, “The boundary between what we reveal and
what we do not, and some control over that boundary, are among the
142
most important attributes of our humanity.” Without privacy, people will engage in harmful self-censorship not only in what they will
say and in what they will do, but even in what they will think as they
143
internalize an awareness that they are always watched. And the abil138

139

140

141

142
143

See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (“Privacy is the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”). “Most definitions of privacy agree on a
core concept: that privacy is the claim of an individual to determine what information
about himself or herself should be known to others. This also involves when such information will be communicated or obtained and what uses will be made of it by others.”
ALAN F. WESTIN, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY: FROM THE HEBREWS AND GREEKS
TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 4 (presented and distributed at the 2009 Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and quoted with permission).
See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968) (“[P]rivacy [i]s that aspect of social
order by which persons control access to information about themselves.”). Others like to
frame privacy as a right to deprive. See, e.g., Jeffrey Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A
Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 32 (1995). Others frame it is a limitation
on others’ access. See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 135, at 423 (“Our interest in privacy, I argue, is related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to which we are
known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the extent to
which we are the subject of others’ attention. This concept of privacy as a concern for
limited accessibility enables us to identify when losses of privacy occur.”).
See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763 (“[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her
person.”). The Court rejected a more “cramped notion of personal privacy” relying upon
secrecy. Id.
See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY
OF SOCIAL LIFE 81–82 (2010). Nissenbaum’s insightful gathering and characterization of
philosophies is highly recommended. See id. at 67–78; see also Thomas P. Crocker, From
Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2009)
(explaining autonomy through a privacy lens).
Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4 (1998).
See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 75–76; Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH.
L. REV. 465, 483–93 (2015); Reiman, supra note 139, at 41–42. Even merely a reminder of
the concept of surveillance affects behavior. See, e.g., Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being
Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World Setting, 2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412 (2006),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1686213/ (finding that people contributed nearly three times as much for drinks when an image of human eyes was displayed
nearby); Terence C. Burnham & Brian Hare, Engineering Human Cooperation, 18 HUM.
NATURE 88, 99 (2007), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12110-007-9012-2
(finding an increase in simulated public good behavior when an image of a robot with
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ity to think freely and critically is essential to full development of
144
This is not to deny, of course, that social
one’s moral character.
145
pressures can be beneficial ones, but instead only to recognize that
146
they can also be debilitating in the extreme.
Furthermore, without privacy people are (at best) stunted in their
ability to form meaningful and diverse relationships, as those relationships depend upon a volitional, gradual, and granular mutual
147
sharing of information. As Nagel explains, “selective intimacy permits some interpersonal relations to be open to forms of exposure
that are needed for the development of a complete life. No one but
a maniac will express absolutely everything to anyone, but most of us

144

145

146

147

human eyes was displayed); Max Ernest-Jones et al., Effects of Eye Images on Everyday Cooperative Behavior: A Field Experiment, 32 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 172, 176 (2011),
https://www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/daniel.nettle/ernestjonesnettlebateson.pdf (finding that
people littered half as often when an image of human eyes was displayed nearby); see also
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (recognizing the internal significance of feeling watched); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT
RISK 92–95 (2007) (building off Foucault’s work and others to describe the impact of losing “public anonymity”).
In the words of Edward Bloustein, “[t]he man who is compelled to live every minute
of his life among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is
subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human dignity.
Such an individual merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be
different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones;
his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth
and to become the feelings of every man. Such a being, although sentient, is fungible; he
is not an individual.” Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964). Or in the words of Ruth Gavison,
if subjected to a world without privacy, “[w]e would probably try hard to suppress our
daydreams and fantasies once others had access to them. We would try to erase from our
minds everything we would not be willing to publish, and we would try not to do anything
that would make us likely to be feared, ridiculed, or harmed. There is a terrible flatness
in the person who could succeed in these attempts.” Gavison, supra note 135, at 443.
See Jeroen van den Hoven, Information Technology, Privacy, and the Protection of Personal Data,
in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 301, 315–16 (Jeroen van den
Hoven & John Weckert eds., 2008); NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 78.
See William H. Simon, Rethinking Privacy, BOS. REV. (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/william-simon-rethinking-privacy-surveillance
(“The second trope of the paranoid style is the portrayal of virtually all tacit social pressure as insidious.”).
See, e.g, Azar Nafisi, Surveillance States, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/06/14/books/review/surveillance-states.html (“It stays with you, that
fear. It burrows under the skin. Even after you escape and are thousands of miles or
many years away, you will still sometimes feel you are being watched. Something within
you has been permanently damaged by the terrible knowledge of the human capability
for cruelty and your own weaknesses in the face of it.”).
See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 84; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 89, 209–18 (2000); Fried, supra note 139, at 477;
Gavison, supra note 135, at 450. See generally IRWIN ALTMAN & DALMAS A. TAYLOR, SOCIAL
PENETRATION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1973).
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need someone to whom we can express a good deal that we would
148
As Ferdinand Shoeman explains,
not reveal to others.”
“[i]nformation appropriate in the context of one relationship may
149
Indeed, devoid of intended and
not be appropriate in another.”
appropriate context, information can present a vastly incomplete if
150
A spouse, for example,
not completely inaccurate assessment.
should have sufficient knowledge of a partner that she can place any
new information in nearly its correct context, but a stranger, acquaintance, or even fairly good friend might totally misperceive its
relevance. As Andrew Taslitz has noted, not only does otherassessment have practical manifestations (e.g., loss of a job oppor151
tunity), but psychologically we hold other-assessment dear.
Without privacy, people thus have less fully developed characters
and relationships, which in turn are the constituent elements of a ro152
In other
bust marketplace of ideas, associations, and religions.
words, privacy may be critical to the individual in a manner necessary
to identity formation and to robust small-scale personal relationships,
but it is ultimately of collective societal importance, especially to a de153
mocracy. Thus, it is not surprising that Alan Westin found a correlation between political philosophy and privacy throughout western
154
And there are other ramifications. Without privacy
civilization.
there is increased identity theft, stalking, and other information-

148
149
150

151
152
153

154

Nagel, supra note 142, at 10.
Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS,
supra note 135, at 403, 408.
See WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890), http://psychclassics.
asu.edu/James/Principles/prin10.htm (“Properly speaking, a man has as many social
selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their
mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him. But as the individuals who
carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares.
He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups.” (emphasis omitted)).
Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to Protect Privacy in
Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195, 218–19 (2014).
See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 86; PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 221
(1995).
See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912–18 (2013) (arguing
that diminished privacy shrinks the capacity for democratic self-government); Gavison,
supra note 135, at 455 (“Privacy is also essential to democratic government because it fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a democracy.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 560–63 (1995).
See WESTIN, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 138, at 4–5, 9.
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based or assisted crimes. 155 And given asymmetries of power, distortions in information privacy tend to run solely in one direction, or at
least are not distributed equally, benefiting some at the costs of oth156
ers.
Of course, to assert that information privacy is about control is not
to say that one must exercise absolute control. Most rights, and perhaps all rights, are not absolute, and in this case absolute control is
unthinkable. First, nobody would benefit from exercising control to
157
And society could not permit absolute
achieve absolute seclusion.
control, not only because it would have too great a cost to the social
order, but also because once any information about me is known to
another person, my right of privacy control runs up against their
158
right of free expression.
Fortunately, people innately understand this and rarely, if ever,
expect absolute control. But they do wish to exercise some control,
even as they are becoming increasingly disillusioned regarding their
159
As sociologist Christena Nippert-Eng explains
ability to do so.
based upon her recent studies, “[I]t became clear that what I now
think of as the process of ‘selective concealment and disclosure’ plays
an important role in how we try to achieve privacy. This is the daily
activity of trying to deny or grant varying amounts of access to our

155
156
157

158
159

See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 78; Van den Hoven, supra note 144, at 311–12 (“information-based harm”).
See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 79; Van den Hoven, supra note 144, at 312–13 (“informational inequality”).
See Gavison, supra note 135, at 440 (“We start from the obvious fact that both perfect privacy and total loss of privacy are undesirable. Individuals must be in some intermediate
state—a balance between privacy and interaction—in order to maintain human relations,
develop their capacities and sensibilities, create and grow, and even to survive.”).
Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975) (striking down a state
statute prohibiting the publication of a rape victim’s name).
See MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND
SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 30 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/
2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf (finding “91% of [American] adults
‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that ‘consumers have lost control over how personal information is collected and used by companies.’”); Peter H. Schwartz et al., Patient Preferences
in Controlling Access to Their Electronic Health Records: A Prospective Cohort Study in Primary
Care, 30 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED., S25, S27 (2014) (finding almost half of patients will hide
certain health information from their health-care providers if given the choice). The
Schwartz study is perhaps especially interesting, because as Amitai Etzioni has pointed
out, merely asking a person if she would like more privacy is akin to asking whether she
would like more health; better information requires recognizing that more of ‘x’ might
have some other cost. Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN
APPLIED ETHICS 253, 253 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2005).
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private matters to specific people in specific ways.” 160 Nippert-Eng
unsurprisingly found disparate people each trying to achieve their
161
preferred balance.
Thus, while any replacement is far less crisp and easy, I have long
been a critic of the Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine, which
tries to artificially categorize all information as either totally secret
(purely private) or freely available to law enforcement (effectively
162
purely accessible). Attempting to force people to maintain absolute
secrecy in order to have any degree of constitutional protection is un163
realistic and counter-productive.
But what does a control theory of information privacy have to say
about investigatory time machines? Obviously at least as to government created ones, there is a serious tension, and it is a tension that
goes to the heart of privacy’s motivations. Can we fully develop as
human beings, with the necessarily divergent ideas and willingness to
express them that a thriving democracy requires, if the government is
160

161

162

163

CHRISTENA NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY 2 (2010). Thus, consistent with a control
theory, “The goal is to achieve selectivity in both [disclosure and concealment]—to carefully choose exactly what is disclosed and concealed, to whom, and how.” Id. at 7. When
people were individually interviewed and asked the very general question, “What does
privacy mean to you?”, a large majority in some manner described the control theory. See
id. (noting that the answers of forty-five of fifty-seven participants could be so classified);
see generally MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES ABOUT
PRIVACY, SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/
2015/05/Privacy-and-Security-Attitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf (finding that Americans want
to control who can access their personal information but doubt they are currently able to
do so).
NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 160, at 8 (“For the people in this study [] ‘good’ privacy exists
when the things they want to be private are as private as they want them to be. It’s a wonderfully subjective, relativistic standard . . . . [C]ontrol over the amount and type of disclosure and concealment is what really defines their assessment of the situation.” (emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 5 (positing “[w]hen we think of privacy [] what we really
think of is a condition of relative inaccessibility. Any point on the scale has both a degree
of privateness and a degree of publicness associated with it” (emphasis omitted)).
See generally Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH 431 (2013); Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely
Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011) [hereinafter Timely Demise]; Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975
(2007); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55
CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2006); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507 (2005)
[hereinafter Nothing New].
See NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 160, at 5 (“[A]cquiring privacy is only part of the problem
. . . . The totality of the task is to achieve a balance between the need and desire for both
privacy and publicity—for a certain degree of concealment and disclosure, for denying
and granting access to others.” (emphasis omitted)).
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always watching? No. Of course, in even the most totalitarian regimes there have proved to be some persons who exercise unpopular
autonomy, but then truly pervasive technology like we have today has
never before been available. And, more importantly, as Ruth Gavison
explains, “Even if we grant that privacy may not be a necessary condition for autonomy for all, . . . it is enough to justify it as a value that
most people may require it. We are not all giants, and societies
should enable all, not only the exceptional, to seek moral autono164
An ideal democracy requires thoughtful participation from
my.”
far more than just a few.
Thus, there is good reason to be extremely skeptical of any government-mandated time machines, and outside of the particular instances in which they have historically been used (e.g., banking,
pharmaceuticals, and hotels), we might do best to forbid them,
whether constitutionally or otherwise. Indeed, it might be wise to reconsider even those we have historically permitted; the Supreme
165
Court in Patel struck down a 116-year-old reporting ordinance. But
at the very least, a drone hovering high overhead that records all public movements seems problematic, as do mammoth databases of digital information that can later be searched. On the other hand,
broad-based surveillance does have benefits. More inclusive surveillance benefits from a genuine check in the political process, and can
more evenly distribute the costs and provide superior accountabil166
So, is it possible to have our cake and eat it too? If there are
ity.
sufficiently robust access, use, and disclosure limitations, can they ever ameliorate the very serious privacy concerns? I first address
whether such use restrictions could be found within the Fourth
Amendment, and then turn to the wisdom of their adoption in the
very limited context of police body cameras.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT USE RESTRICTIONS AND POLICE BODY
CAMERAS
In a prescient article from 1995, Harold Krent argued that—
whatever definitions of search and seizure are required to make it
happen—the uses to which law enforcement can put lawfully ac164
165
166

Gavison, supra note 135, at 450.
See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2464 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
See Simon, supra note 145 (“[B]road-reach electronic mechanisms have an advantage in
addressing the danger that surveillance will be unfairly concentrated on particular
groups; targeting criteria, rather than reflecting rigorous efforts to identify wrongdoers,
may reflect cognitive bias or group animus.”).
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quired information should be governed by the Fourth Amendment’s
167
According to Krent, “Rapidly develreasonableness requirement.
oping technology has thrust the use issue to the forefront: what the
government does with information may now threaten privacy more
168
than the collection itself.” The Ganias Second Circuit panel adopted such a use restriction: even if it was permissible for investigators to
retain the nonresponsive computer data for such a long period, it was
not permissible to search through that data—to use that data—in a
new investigation, even pursuant to a newly obtained search war169
rant. Although it is not clear that Krent would agree with this par170
ticular use limitation, he recognized that generally such limits are
conducive to the control theory of information privacy: each different use of the data interferes with a person’s ability to control for what
171
purposes information about her is utilized.
Neither the Ganias panel nor Krent argued that use restrictions
should be the sole Fourth Amendment restrictions: the original law
enforcement acquisition remains subject to traditional restraints. For
example, merely agreeing to limit use would of course not itself justify compulsory copying of Ganias’ hard drives. But there might be
circumstances when it is impossible to get the desired law enforcement safety benefit without completely abandoning front-end acquisition restraints, as with broad scale, panvasive drone surveillance, or
172
In
with broad scale, panvasive internet surveillance for malware.
167
168

169

170

171
172

Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74
TEX. L. REV. 49, 49–51, 51 n.14 (1995).
Id. at 51. Krent went on to argue for a more specific rule, namely that the only reasonable uses are ones “disclosed or implicit at the time of the underlying seizure,” requiring
the state to “precommit to all uses of information and items seized.” Id. at 53; see id. at
85–92 (developing this proposed limitation).
See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226,
246, 250 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding the warrantless DNA testing of lawfully seized items
from a non-arrestee to constitute an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search); Orin S.
Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (2015) (arguing that limited use restrictions are plausible given the necessary over-seizure in the digital search context); cf. Commonwealth v. Arzola,
470 Mass. 809, 820 (Mass. 2015) (holding the DNA testing of lawfully seized items from
an arrestee did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search).
Krent would permit a later use when “the subsequent use would have itself legitimated
the initial search.” Krent, supra note 167, at 93. That would seem true of the later search
warrant in Ganias. However, as prescient as Krent’s article was in 1995, he did not consider the unique nature of computer searches, which might (or might not) alter his conclusions.
Id. at 51 nn.14 & 18, 92 n.199.
Christopher Slobogin has coined the term “panvasive” “to capture the idea that modern
government’s efforts at keeping tabs on the citizenry routinely and randomly reach across
huge numbers of people, most of whom are innocent of any wrongdoing.” Christopher
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each instance, assuming complete automation, the key privacy harm
seems to occur only upon human viewing, or use. Of course, this
does not mean the sole privacy harm occurs upon use. If humanprogrammed algorithms are making decisions based upon content,
that seems a relevant use regardless of the lack of direct human ob173
And, as described above, knowing that all of our moveservation.
ments, online or off, will be recorded for potential later perusal can
very meaningfully chill those actions. Jeremy Bentham long ago realized that constant observation was not necessary in his Panopticon;
174
merely its potential was sufficient to achieve the same results. Thus,
European courts have recently rejected requirements that internet
175
service providers retain information for defined periods of time.
So, we should be extremely cautious in accepting ex-post use and
dissemination controls as a substitute for—as opposed to a supplement to—front-end acquisition controls. But as part of this calculus
we should recognize the benefits of broad access, including its more
uniform distribution and thus greater political accountability. As I
argued some ten years ago, whether the issue is DNA databanking or
a thermal scan of homes or a millimeter wave scan of persons (as now
takes place at airports), advanced notice and broad and uniform applicability trigger the protections of the political process in a way that
most contemporary policing does not, and this should factor into
176
In this, I was building upon
Fourth Amendment reasonableness.

173

174

175

176

Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102
GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723 (2014).
See Henderson, Timely Demise, supra note 162, at 47–48 (responding to argument of Richard Posner); see also SCHNEIER, supra note 15, at 130 (“Whether or not anyone actually
looks at our data, the very facts that (1) they could, and (2) they guide the algorithms
that do, make it surveillance.”).
See The Panopticon, UCL BENTHAM PROJECT, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-Project/
who/panopticon (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). George Orwell used the same concept in his
1984: “There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any
given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the
time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to
live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you
made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.” GEORGE
ORWELL, 1984, at 4 (1949).
See Davis v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2015] QBD 3665,
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/davis_watson_order.pdf
(invalidating UK data retention law); Case C-293, Dig. Rights Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for
Commc’ns, 2014 E.C.R. 845, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text
=&docid=150642&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN (invalidating the 2006 Data Retention Directive).
See Henderson, Nothing New, supra note 162, at 555–59.
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the arguments of William Stuntz 177 and the Supreme Court’s school
178
Christopher Slobogin has recently developed
drug testing cases.
the concept into a more rich theory of representative democracy—
relying upon the constitutional scholarship of John Hart Ely—that
would provide judicial review even where the government activity
179
does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure.”
But again, whatever the benefits of even a well-functioning political process, there are strong reasons to be cautious. As Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor argued in personally rejecting the Court’s permissive
regime of drug testing for student athletes, we have a strong tradition
against general warrants, and “[b]lanket searches, because they can
involve thousands or millions of searches, pose a greater threat to liberty than do suspicion-based ones, which affect one person at a
180
time.” Nonetheless, it would be just as wrong to ignore the fairness
benefit of broad applicability, as it would to think a “misery loves
company” conception would be ideal across the board (the latter of
which would adopt wholesale the hated general warrants of our
181
founding period).
It seems there might be limited, relatively narrow circumstances in
which we should embrace solely use restrictions, and I submit that
one of them might be for law enforcement body cameras. Of course,
perhaps this is an unfairly easy case, because in order for the camera
to capture anything, the law enforcement officer should already be
lawfully present, a criterion that brings its own sometimes-significant
front-end restrictions. But such recording nonetheless creates time
machines, and lots of them: there are almost a million law enforce182
With officers on duty at all
ment officers in the United States.
177

178

179
180
181
182

See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 2166 (2002)
(“[S]preading the cost of policing through a larger slice of the population . . . reduces
the odds of voters demanding harsh and intrusive police tactics secure in the knowledge
that those tactics will be applied only to others.”).
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995) (“In many respects, we
think, testing based on ‘suspicion’ of drug use would not be better, but worse.”). In its
drug testing cases, the Court has also been swayed by use restrictions, holding searches
reasonable in part based upon the limited government use of positive testing. See Henderson, Nothing New, supra note 162, at 560–61.
See Slobogin, supra note 172, at 1724, 1733–37.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 667 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (deriding a
“misery loves company” Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL FUND, LAW ENFORCEMENT FACTS: KEY
DATA ABOUT THE PROFESSION, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2016); see also By the Numbers: How Many Cops Are There In the USA?, THE SKEPTICAL
LIBRARIAN (Aug. 26, 2014), http://blog.skepticallibertarian.com/2014/08/26/by-thenumbers-how-many-cops-are-there-in-the-usa/.
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times, watching over mostly innocent behavior as well as some criminal, if every one records his or her entire shift, that is a staggering
amount of data.
Those recordings will psychologically affect the officers, and not
only in the sense of promoting good behavior. As discussed above,
nobody does well to be under constant surveillance (though, interestingly, to many thousands of Americans working in retail and other
industries it is probably already their daily reality—albeit without accompanying audio—and these workers might have little to no promises regarding ex-post use and dissemination). Nor is it the case that
these recordings will merely duplicate what officers could themselves
personally explain. Instead, high quality cameras would record all
sorts of events and details never noticed by the officers, and potentially permanently store them for later high-tech perusal (e.g., zoom in
183
Moreover, for things an officer does notice—
and slow down).
which will include highly traumatic events—the digital record will
remain forever pristine, whereas memories quickly degrade and even
184
fade entirely. Such cameras would record not “only” events taking
place in public, but instead would record everywhere officers go, including the interiors of our homes and therefore potentially under
every bed and into every drawer. So even if officer presence already
has an access (and thus acquisition) limitation, it would not necessarily follow that nothing more should be required for the further intru185
sion of recording.
However, these panvasive qualities of officer recording also make
for some of its benefits. As long as there have been police, we have
had to rely not only upon their perceptions of what they observe, but
upon their memories of those perceptions. Both perception and
183

184

185

Of course, sometimes a camera’s preserving things unnoticed is precisely its utility. See
MARC JONATHAN BLITZ, POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: EVIDENTIARY BENEFITS AND
PRIVACY THREATS 5–6 (2015).
On the benefits of human forgetting, see Henderson, supra note 11, at 708–09. As Bruce
Schneier has stated in the online context, “I used to say that Google knows more about
what I’m thinking of than my wife does. But that doesn’t go far enough. Google knows
more about what I’m thinking than I do, because Google remembers all of it perfectly
and forever.” SCHNEIER, supra note 15, at 22. And it gets still more privacy invasive, because via data mining Google can learn correlations and patterns in your thinking of
which you have never been consciously aware.
At the very least such videos should not all become public records, as might be the default in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jessica Bruha, Local Law Enforcement Testing Body Cams,
NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.normantranscript.com/news/locallaw-enforcement-testing-body-cams/article_c61e8ff4-4052-11e4-b4eb-eb2c7f02e600.html
(“[D]ue to a law going into effect . . . the video becomes public record and the department is obligated to turn over a copy to any member of the public.”).
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memory are fallible, and recollection thereof subject to falsification.
Of course, we have done what we can. Because memory dissipates
quickly, it is helpful when police contemporaneously record their
perceptions, and hence we value the ubiquitous police report (which
also “freezes” the account, making later fabrication more difficult).
With the advent of readily mobile photography, police could better
preserve those observations deemed sufficiently important, and pho186
tography of crime scenes thus became routine. With the advent of
187
tape recording, certain police-citizen interactions were recorded.
And with the advent of videotaping, we became accustomed to its
benefits in certain contexts, such as video recordings of traffic stops
via cameras fixed in police vehicles. But when that videotaping made
it to the interior of the home, it caused concern, a concern that
188
reached the Supreme Court in 1999 in the case of Wilson v. Layne.

186

187

188

Yet that photography has sometimes proved controversial when used to fill “gang books”
of known and suspected gang members for use in future investigations, when part of a restaged arrest to permit the press a perp walk, or—in its most modern manifestation—
when an officer took his own selfie during a perp walk. See Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d
202, 213 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding unconstitutional a restaged perp walk because it had no
legitimate law enforcement purpose); Brown v. Pepe, 42 F. Supp. 3d 310, 316 n.10 (D.
Mass. 2014) (holding an officer’s “selfie” was at most a de minimis privacy intrusion);
Commonwealth v. Cao, 644 N.E.2d 1294, 1296–99 (Mass. 1995) (holding the procedure
used to obtain a photograph for a gang book did not constitute a seizure); People v. Rodriguez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 663–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding unconstitutional a
stop used to obtain a photograph for a gang book).
Tape recording likewise sometimes proved controversial, especially in the undercover
context. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963).
526 U.S. 603 (1999); see also Oziel v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1284,
1296, 1302 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (not deciding the constitutionality of police videotaping
the execution of a search warrant but refusing media access to that footage). Since Wilson, media presence has continued to cause potential Fourth Amendment violations. See,
e.g., United States v. Hendrixson, 234 F.3d 494, 496 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that media
involvement at the execution of a search warrant in a home was a Fourth Amendment violation, but did not require exclusion of evidence); Smart v. City of Miami, 2015 WL
3409329, at *12–13 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2015) (finding plaintiff’s § 1983 claim sufficient to
overcome summary judgment based on the theory that police inviting a crew from “First
48” to film plaintiff’s home was a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Carr v. Montgomery Cnty., 59 F. Supp. 3d 787, 798 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding a plausible § 1983 claim for
bringing a third-party film crew into a home to videotape a warrantless search); Frederick
v. Biography Channel, 683 F. Supp. 2d 798, 799–802 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding a plausible
§ 1983 claim against a media company where plaintiffs were detained longer than police
needed for arrest, just so that a film crew could arrive to cover it); Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding plausible § 1983 and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against media defendant for their show “To
Catch a Predator” having an unusually pervasive presence and influence throughout an
investigation that led the target to eventually commit suicide); Thompson v. State, 824
N.E.2d 1265, 1266, 1268–69, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a film crew’s pres-
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As part of “Operation Gunsmoke,” United States Marshals were
working with local Maryland police to apprehend dangerous crimi189
nals, including one Dominic Wilson. Unfortunately, the address in
police files was that of Wilson’s parents, so when police entered the
home to execute an arrest warrant—accompanied by invited representatives of the media—what they found was Dominic’s father
roused from bed and dressed only in briefs and Dominic’s mother in
190
Before police were made aware of, or at least were
a nightgown.
convinced of, their mistake, they forcibly subdued the elder Mr. Wilson at gunpoint while a photographer from the Washington Post
191
The Court unanimously held that the officers
took photographs.
violated the Fourth Amendment by bringing representatives of the
192
However, the
media into a home entered pursuant to a warrant.
Court acknowledged government interests that could be furthered by
law enforcement’s own recording: accurately publicizing efforts to
combat crime (furthering education and deterrence), deterring and
detecting police abuse, protecting the safety of officers, and preserv193
Thus, “it might be reasonable for police officers to
ing evidence.
194
themselves videotape home entries.”
The benefits the Court proffered are real and can be significant.
As for evidence preservation, recording can preserve evidence with195
out requiring its physical removal; preserve evidence that would

189
190
191
192

193
194
195

ence during a strip search in the defendant’s motel room violated the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights and warranted exclusion of the evidence gained during that search).
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id. at 614. Eight Justices believed, however, that before this decision the law was not
clearly established, and therefore that the officers enjoyed qualified immunity. See id. at
615; id. at 618 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). On the merits, the Court also distinguished circumstances in which a party is brought in the home to assist the police in their
task, as when a citizen is brought along to identify stolen property. See id. at 611–12.
See id. at 612–13.
Id. at 613.
This can serve First Amendment, privacy, law enforcement, and practical values. As for
the First Amendment, see, for example, City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Center, 566
N.E.2d 207, 213 (Ohio Mun. 1990) (approving of officers executing a search warrant by
videotaping an allegedly obscene art exhibit, which negates otherwise serious concerns of
pre-adjudication censorship). As for privacy, in some circumstances it might be difficult
for police to distinguish what is subject to seizure, and if probable cause justifies a greater
seizure, recording might provide a lesser invasion. For example, in Commonwealth v.
Balicki, 762 N.E.2d 290, 294–95 (Mass. 2002), defendants were believed to have purchased
household items with public funds. In such a case, there might be nothing about tainted
items that immediately commands attention, yet there might be probable cause (fair
probability) to seize a great portion of them. Similarly, federal agents involved in the
2005 search of Representative William Jefferson’s home opted to photograph documents
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otherwise be destroyed by investigatory or non-investigatory govern196
ment actions, or simply by the passage of time; and preserve evidence in its most pristine form, allowing a judge or juror to view it
197
herself. One could imagine recordings being used to routinely decide such contested issues as whether a person consented to an entry
or search, and if so, the scope of that consent; whether a reasonable
officer would have believed a person to be in need of immediate assistance; whether there was a fair probability that evidence would be
imminently destroyed; whether police exceeded the authorization of
a warrant; or whether an officer reasonably believed deadly force was
198
To be sure, no single video is “perfect,” as the camera
justified.

196

197

198

for which they alleged probable cause, and thus for which they could have executed a
“plain view” warrantless seizure, because the documents were not directly responsive to
the warrant’s list of seizable items. United States v. Jefferson, 571 F. Supp. 2d 696, 700
(E.D. Va. 2008). As for practicality, there will of course be instances in which physical seizure is impractical or even impossible. See, e.g., People v. Bambino, N.Y. L.J. 25 (Aug. 4,
1992) (Nassau Cnty. Justice Ct. 1992) (photography/videography where defendants were
believed to have an apartment in their basement in violation of applicable zoning law);
State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 530 (Iowa 1981) (photography of tire tracks). And as
for law enforcement interests, it might be necessary to preserve evidence without tipping
off a suspect. See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1330 (2d Cir. 1990) (authorizing a “sneak and peak” or “covert entry” warrant to search a property for evidence
of cocaine manufacturing that would be photographed but not physically seized).
This interest arises whenever police entry is predicated upon emergency aid, during
which their protective actions will sometimes destroy unseen or in-the-moment unappreciated evidence (or during which a malicious officer could destroy “undesirable” evidence). It also arises when victims’ bodies are to be moved. See, e.g., Forbes v. State, 1995
WL 241722, *5–6 (Tex. App. 1995) (permitting photography and videotaping prior to
medical examiner and photography by medical examiner); State v. Wright, 558 A.2d 946,
950–51 (R.I. 1989), abrogated on other ground recognized by State v. Brennan, 627 A.2d 842,
848 (R.I. 1993) (same); State v. Anderson, 599 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Or. App. 1979) (permitting videotaping prior to removal of victim’s body); Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 488–90
(Del. 1967) (permitting photography prior to removal of victim’s body). Or when there
is a fire. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 289 (1984) (reaffirming and applying
these principles); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510–12 (1978) (establishing three
tiered structure for searches of fire scenes); Schultz v. State, 593 P.2d 640, 643 (Alaska
1979) (permitting photography during emergency fire search); Dubbs v. State, 157
S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942). And sometimes evidence is naturally evanescent, such as a pool of blood not yet dried into a carpet, which might indicate something
about the time of an attack or other relevant event. See, e.g., Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935,
942 (Wyo. 1983) (permitting photography to preserve evanescent evidence, though in an
opinion fraught with scientific error and weak legal reasoning), overruled in part on other
grounds, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 692 (Wyo. 1995).
See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (relying upon dash camera video to hold officers acted reasonably in using deadly force). The Supreme Court has noted this evidentiary advantage in the context of undercover recordings. See United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 753 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963).
See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (noting dash camera video that was
presumably used in determining consent to search); United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617,
622 n.1 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting use of dash camera video to determine reasonable suspi-
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perspective can itself suggest a cognitive frame and thereby affect
199
But it is far better than without. In
these myriad determinations.
the straightforward words of the Alaska Supreme Court in the context
of recording custodial interrogations, “a recording will help trial and
200
appellate courts to ascertain the truth.”
Thus, preservation has secondary benefits, including in deterring
and detecting police abuse. There are ample recorded examples,
201
from detectives playing Wii Bowling during a home search, to accident investigators “do[ing] a little Walt Disney to protect [a] cop”
202
The most prominent recent exwho rear-ended another vehicle.

199

200
201
202

cion); Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 639 (6th Cir. 2015) (using dash camera to determine excessive force); Green v. Throckmorton, 681 F.3d 853, 862 (6th Cir. 2012) (using dash camera to determine whether reasonable suspicion was materially disputed);
Lee v. Anderson, 616 F.3d 803, 812 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting jury’s use of video in determining whether deadly force was reasonable and relying upon video in denying claim of
insufficient evidence); United States v. Nicholson, 17 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1994)
(noting magistrate’s use of dash camera video in determining consent); United States v.
Abarza, No. 1:14–cr–179–MC, 2015 WL 69556684, at *1–3 (D. Or. Nov. 6, 2015) (noting
the usefulness of dash camera footage and using it to negate allegations like “high-crime
area” and nervousness); Burnett v. Unified Gov. of Athens-Clarke Cnty., No. 3:08-CV-04
(CDL), 2009 WL 5175296, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2009) (noting defendant’s refusal to
consent in dash camera video); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 116 A.3d 1139, 1143–44 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2015) (using dash camera footage to determine the extent of physical manipulation during a Terry stop); Lampkin v. State, 470 S.W.3d 876, 888–89 (Tex. Ct. App.
2015) (using dash camera footage used to determine whether defendant was intoxicated); Scott v. State, 559 So. 2d 269, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that video of
search warrant execution did not conflict with trial court’s findings regarding knock and
announce); Kimberly Kindy & Julie Tate, Police Withhold Videos Despite Vows of Transparency,
WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/10/08/
police-withhold-videos-despite-vows-of-transparency/ (discussing utility of police body
cameras in fatal shootings); Richard Perez-Pena, Officer Indicted in Shooting Death of Unarmed Man, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2015, at A1 (describing use of officer body camera in
murder indictment). This is of course a benefit in the videotaping of interrogation. See,
e.g., State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 454–56 (Iowa 2006) (relying upon and encouraging
such recording).
See generally Kwangbai Park & Jimin Pyo, An Explanation for Camera Perspective Bias in Voluntariness Judgment for Video-Recorded Confession: Suggestion of Cognitive Frame, 36 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 184–85 (2012).
Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Alaska 1985).
See Steve Andrews, Polk Sheriff Disciplines Wii-Playing Deputies, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 11, 2009,
at 4; Steve Andrews, A Wii Bit Distracted, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 22, 2009, at 1.
See Tonya Alanez, Ex-Hollywood Officers Accused of Falsifying Crash Report Now Face Federal
Lawsuit, SUN SENTINEL (June 4, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-0604/news/fl-hollywood-cops-federal-lawsuit-20100604_1_andrea-tomassi-officer-deweypressley-officer-joel-francisco; Tonya Alanez, DUI Charge Dropped After Cops Accused of Crash
Cover-Up, SUN SENTINEL (July 30, 2009), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-0730/news/hollywood_1_dui-charge-finkelstein-broward-state-attorney; see also Jim Dwyer,
Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2005, at A1, B4 (reporting on videotape contradicting police reports concerning arrests at the 2004 Republican
National Convention); Jim Dwyer, A Switch Is Flipped, and Justice Listens In, N.Y. TIMES
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amples might be the shootings of Walter Scott and Samuel Dubose,
203
each of which resulted in murder charges against the police officer.
It seems self-evident that video would deter (and where that fails, detect) abuse, an inference supported by police recording in Rialto,
California. In the first year of body camera recording, complaints
against officers fell by 88% and use of force by officers fell by almost
204
60%. Thus, in Judge Shira A. Scheindlin’s 2013 order holding unconstitutional the New York Police Department’s stop and frisk tac205
To be
tics, she required a trial program of officer body cameras.
most effective, that video must record all police-citizen interaction—
206
lest officers only turn it on when it serves their purposes —and be

203

204

205
206

(Dec.
8,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/08/nyregion/08about.html?
pagewanted=print&_r=0 (reporting on an officer falsely claiming a recorded interrogation had never taken place); John Eligon, No Jail for Ex-Officer Over Toppled Bicyclist, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A26 (reporting on an incident in which a New York City officer
body slammed a bicyclist and then, adding insult to injury, charged him with attempted
assault and disorderly conduct); Sasha Goldstein, Police Dash Cam Video Exonerates New Jersey Man, Leads to Indictment of Cops, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/police-dash-cam-video-exonerates-nj-manimplicates-cops-article-1.1701763 (reporting on dash camera footage that exonerated a
man from evading arrest and proved police had falsified records); David A. Graham, The
Death of Jeremy Mardis and the Honesty of the Police, ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/11/the-death-of-jeremy-mardis-andtrustworthy-police/415437/ (reporting police lying about an incident that left a 6-yearold boy dead and the body camera footage that proved it); Kim Minugh, Faked Reports Put
Cop in Jail, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.sacbee.com/mobile/beesbest/article2577255.html (reporting on an officer who provided false information in a
number of police reports); Joe Sharkey, A Constitutional Case in a Box of Cash, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2009, at B5 (reporting on an illegitimate and abusive detention of an airplane
passenger for carrying a significant amount of cash).
See Alan Blinder & Timothy Williams, Ex-South Carolina Officer Is Indicted in Shooting Death
of Black Man, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2015, at A12; see also Perez-Pena, supra note 198; Damien
Cave & Rochelle Oliver, The Videos That Are Putting Race and Policing into Sharp Relief, N.Y.
TIMES (updated Oct. 27, 2015), www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/us/policevideos-race.html (gathering videos depicting numerous instances of alleged excessive use
of force by the police).
See Ian Lovett, In California, a Champion for Police Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/in-california-a-champion-for-policecameras.html; see generally MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS:
ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE (2014), https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/
files/spotlight/download/Police%20Officer%20Body-Worn%20Cameras.pdf (articulating the strengths and weaknesses of available empirical evidence).
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
See LINDSAY MILLER & JESSICA TOLIVER,
POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM,
IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS
LEARNED 12–14 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/47201491213471524
6869.pdf (describing ACLU position that would require recording all police-citizen interaction, but also describing counter arguments); see id. at 40–42 (making particular recommendations); Ill. S.B. 1304 § 10-20(a)(3) (requiring, with articulated exceptions, that
“[c]ameras must be turned on at all times when the officer is in uniform and is re-
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tamper-resistant. 207 And when it comes to deterring and detecting
abuse, turnabout is fair play. Recording can shield police against
false allegations of abuse as well as deter or at least detect poor citizen
decisions, perhaps including some that caused those previously unrecorded use of force incidents.
So, given the myriad benefits of tamper-resistant, always-on officer
recording—where “always on” includes cameras with a significant,
typically-overwritten buffer meant to become permanent when triggered by an officer-citizen interaction—it seems such recording is
worth the privacy cost. But this merely means police should record.
It remains to be determined—or should remain to be determined—
what can be done with those recordings, which of course preserve
immense amounts of otherwise ephemeral irrelevant information like
the takedown of an innocent man in his bedclothes in Wilson v.
Layne. The mere preservation of that information is a meaningful
harm, if nothing else because the relevant parties know there is al208
ways a risk of its further consumption and dissemination. And thus
recording can also harm law enforcement interests if it deters citizen
cooperation and assistance where persons fear criminal reprisal.
Thus, as an administrative matter in police department guidelines, as
a legislative matter, and—I would argue—as a matter of Fourth
Amendment (and state constitutional analog) reasonableness, there
should be use and disclosure limitations on that data. These would
include security from unauthorized access, need-to-know limitations,
209
audit logs, and destruction schedules.
For example, viewing the footage of a home search should at least
sometimes itself constitute a Fourth Amendment search, just like perusing a seized computer. Reentering the home after completion of
210
the search would of course require a new warrant, and just as a

207

208

209
210

sponding to calls for service or engaged in any law enforcement-related encounter
or activity”).
See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 202 (describing prosecution use of a misleadingly edited police
video; the prosecution was dropped when defense attorneys obtained the unedited version); Allesandra Ram, Sandra Bland’s Arrest Footage Shows How Fallible Video Can Be, WIRED
(July 22, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/sandra-blands-arrest-footageshows-fallible-video-can/ (describing recent instance in which odd edits to a controversial
police video seem to be only technical glitches).
For a telling example, see Commonwealth v. Balicki, 762 N.E.2d 290, 295–96 (Mass. 2002),
in which the court describes in detail the many innocent details preserved by the recording of a home search. In today’s “reality television” pseudo-celebrity obsessed culture,
many might be most interested in the criminally irrelevant portions of a search.
See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS §§ 25-6.1, 25-6.2 (3d ed. 2013); see also Ill. S.B. 1304 § 10-20(a)(7).
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 2 CRIM. PROC. § 3.4(j).
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search of a seized hard drive yields previously unknown information,
viewing of video will yield information not noticed by officers, and—
given video enhancement capabilities—information not previously
noticeable. Moreover, the resource and legal restraints are far different when any number of officers can view video in their offices than
when those officers are on the scene executing a search warrant governed by the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, potentially including a judicial warrant. Thus, just as courts have begun to recognize that “digital is different” in other contexts, courts should here
recognize a meaningful difference in kind despite law enforcement
officers traditionally being permitted to re-examine physical items in
their possession. The over-seizure inherent in the recording merits a
different result.
So understood, in the limited context of police body cameras, the
benefits of complete recording seem to outweigh the costs, and
therefore this is a government time machine that I would permit subject only to meaningful access, use, and dissemination controls. This
of course leaves for future work the development of a taxonomy as to
when acquisition restrictions are more or less important, and what
should be the constitutional and statutory rules and administrative
best practices. But it provides a critical perspective as we approach
these decisions, seeing them for what they are: Fourth Amendment
time machines.
CONCLUSION
We are in the midst of dramatic techno-social change. In the
words of Christena Nippert-Eng:
It’s as if a distinct cultural climate change is underway. The ocean has
risen, shrinking our islands of privacy and even submerging many of
them altogether. Like Atlantis, perhaps, some private spaces and times
and matters are fading into the realm of folklore—even legend—their
very existence destined to rest one day on the unsubstantiated claims of
211
prior generations.

The ability of technology for the first time to feasibly record and store
most all behavior—both online and off—is certainly a tectonic shift.
It seriously threatens privacy, and thus all of privacy’s myriad individual and societal benefits.
Of course, any such shift can be exaggerated, and in some sense
little is ever new. In 1890, with the advent of the portable camera, a
newspaper bemoaned that, “This season there is something at the
211

NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 160, at 3–4.
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seaside worse than sharks. It is the amateur photographer.” 212 Yet we
somehow made it through, sufficient privacy intact. Laws have long
required that certain records be retained, and businesses have long
retained far more than what the laws require.
Nonetheless, differences in scope at some point become differences in kind, and I believe there is utility in recognizing today’s digital records for what they are—investigative time machines—and
openly confronting whether their benefits justify their costs. Where
they do, we should utilize access, use, and dissemination restrictions
for our privacy. And in those instances in which only a panvasive
time machine will do, and in which its benefits still outweigh its costs,
213
But these time
we can rely solely upon those ex post restrictions.
machines are fraught with great danger to our humanity and to our
democracy, and thus should be approached with a healthy, if not vigorous distrust. Thus, in this Article I have taken only a baby step,
recommending a use restriction regime for police officer body cameras, recognizing that officer presence builds in acquisition restraints.
Legislatures should provide frameworks for these recordings, requiring reasonable guarantees of secure storage and appropriately re214
If
stricting and disciplining errant access, use, and dissemination.
those restrictions ultimately prove unworkable or insufficient in this

212

213

214

Every Step You Take, ECONOMIST (Nov. 16, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21589862-cameras-become-ubiquitous-and-able-identify-people-more-safeguardsprivacy-will-be.
In the context of the NSA bulk telephony metadata surveillance, the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board recognized that to justify a program solely restricted by use restrictions should require “a strong showing of efficacy.” PCLOB REPORT, supra note 42, at
13.
A growing chorus of voices recognizes the role a legislature should play, and in the relevance of that role to constitutionality. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 824–25
(2d Cir. 2015) (“We note first that whether Congress has considered and authorized a
program such as this one is not irrelevant to its constitutionality. The endorsement of the
Legislative Branch of government provides some degree of comfort in the face of concerns about the reasonableness of the government’s assertions of the necessity of the data
collection . . . . [T]he legislative process has considerable advantages . . . . A congressional
judgment as to what is ‘reasonable’ under current circumstances would carry weight—at
least with us, and, we assume, with the Supreme Court as well—in assessing whether the
availability of information to telephone companies, banks, internet service providers, and
the like, and the ability of the government to collect and process volumes of such data
that would previously have overwhelmed its capacity to make use of the information, render obsolete the third-party records doctrine or, conversely, reduce our expectations of
privacy and make more intrusive techniques both expected and necessary to deal with
new kinds of threats . . . . Ideally, such issues should be resolved by courts only after [executive and legislative] debate, with due respect for any conclusions reached by the coordinate branches of government.”).
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limited context, then we will have learned that they certainly cannot
alone be trusted in other spheres.

